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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY:
LIMITING FEDERAL POWER TO ABROGATE STATE IMMUNITY
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)
I. INTRODUCTION
The Eleventh Amendment guarantees that individual states may not
be sued in federal court by "Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State."1 The United States Supreme Court has,
through the years, carved out exemptions to this rule, providing that suits
may be commenced against states in three instances. 2 The state may be
sued in the following situations: if the state consents to the suit, 3 if Con-
gress supersedes or abrogates the state's immunity through federal
legislation,4 or if a state official seeks to enforce an unconstitutional state
law as a representative of the state. 5 In interpreting these exceptions and
applying them to the United States' federalist system of government, the
Court has closely scrutinized congressional action that requires states to
answer to suit under federal legislation. 6 This case comment will outline
the development of these exceptions, focusing on the abrogation excep-
tion and its application to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act in
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents.7
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.
2. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670
(1999) (stating that a state may be sued only if it waives its immunity and consents to suit or if
Congress enacts laws under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment that abrogates state immunity);
see also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 167 (1908) (refusing to allow the state to confer immunity on
a state official when enforcing an unconstitutional state law).
3. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1883) (rejecting state's claim of sovereign im-
munity because it had voluntarily intervened in the suit as a plaintiff, which thereby opened the door to
claims against it by interpleaders).
4. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 454-56 (1976) (allowing a suit against the state under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act because the Act was properly enacted under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which provided Congress with the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity).
5. See Young, 209 U.S. at 159 (refusing to allow the claim of sovereign immunity to bar a suit
against a state attorney general who violated a federal court's restraining order in order to enforce a
state law).
6. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997) (scrutinizing the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000b(b)
(1994))); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996) (analyzing the Indian Gaming Regu-
latory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2472 (1988) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (1994))); Coll.
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 672-73 (studying the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-
542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1992) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999))); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 637-38 (1999) (examining
the Patent Remedy Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4988 (1994) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h),
296(a) (1994))).
7. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
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II. FACTS
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents arose as a culmination of three
cases in federal court that involved public employees' claims of illegal
discrimination based on age. 8 In December 1994, the first of these cases
was filed by university professors Roderick MacPherson and Marvin
Narz, who sued the Alabama State University System under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).9 MacPherson and Narz
were the oldest faculty members at the University of Montevallo.l0 The
two alleged that the University of Montevallo treated younger professors
more favorably by denying older professors "promotions, committee,
assignments, sabbaticals, and . . . salaries" and "by using an 'age-based
evaluation system"' which disparately impacted older employees.11
They felt that the treatment they received was partially an act of retalia-
tion for the filing of an earlier ADEA suit which had been settled. 12 At
the district court proceeding, the university conceded to the existence of
"genuine issues of material fact" under the ADEA regarding promo-
tions, committee appointments, and sabbatical leave. 13 In spite of this,
the district court granted the university's motion for dismissal on the
ground that suits against the states and state entities were barred by the
Eleventh Amendment's guarantee of state sovereign immunity.14
In April 1995, the second case arose when thirty-six current and
former faculty members of Florida State University and Florida Interna-
tional University, including J. Daniel Kimel, filed claims under the
ADEA for improper implementation of salary adjustments with regard to
older employees.15 The salary adjustments were the result of bargaining
agreements and lawsuits that began in 1991.16 In 1991, the State agreed
to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with long-term faculty
members to remedy the fact that salary adjustments did not accurately
reflect the true market value of the employees' services. 17 Following the
agreement, the Florida legislature set aside the necessary funds to cover
the proposed adjustment, but it later withdrew the money before the
8. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 69-71.
9. Id. at 69; see also Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 9-202, 81 Stat.
602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
10. Brief for Petitioners at *7, Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (No. 98-791).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. (citing Joint Appendix at 113).
14. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 69.
15. Petitioners' Brief at *7-*8, Kimel (No. 98-791).




adjustments could be implemented. 18 The Florida Supreme Court deter-
mined that the withdrawal of the money violated the Florida Constitu-
tion's Contracts Clause, and the money was distributed in a lump sum to
the employees.19 The following year the salary levels returned to their
preadjusted condition. 20 For the 1993-94 academic year, the legislature
appropriated funds to permanently remedy the adjustment situation, but
the Florida Board of Regents refused to require that the state universities
use the money to actually adjust the salaries of the employees in
question. 21
The Board of Regents moved to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity grounds, arguing that the State was not subject to
suit in federal court for claims associated with the ADEA.22 The district
court denied the university's motion, based on its view that the ADEA
was a valid exercise of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
power and that Congress had clearly expressed its intent to abrogate state
sovereign immunity in the language of the statute.23
Finally, in May 1996,24 Wellington Dickson, a corrections officer,
brought the last of the three suits against the Florida Department of
Corrections, claiming he had been denied promised promotions because
of his advanced age. 25 Dickson, who was in his late fifties at the time he
was hired, claimed that when he accepted the position, he was told he
would be promoted within six months to one year.26 After working for
more than five years, however, he had never been promoted, despite the
fact that numerous younger, less qualified employees had been promot-
ed during that time. 27 The Department of Corrections unsuccessfully
moved to dismiss the claims based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity. 28 In its reasoning, the district court cited Congress' clear
intent to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity, as well as its constitu-
tional power to do so.29
18. Id.
19. Id.; see also Chiles v. United Faculty of Fla., 615 So. 2d 671, 672-73 (Fla. 1993).
20. Petitioners' Brief at *8 n.8, Kimel (No. 98-791).
21. Id. This suit was commenced the following April. Id. at *8.
22. Id. at *9.
23. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,70 (2000) (citing Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, No.
95-40194, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7995, at *7 (N.D. Fla. May 17, 1996), app. to petition for cert. in No.
98-796, pp. 57a-62a).
24. Id.
25. Petitioners' Brief at *6, Kimel (No. 98-791). Dickson also alleged that he was subjected to
retaliatory treatment based on his filing of a complaint with the Florida Commission on Human
Relations. Id. at *6-*7.
26. Id. at *6.
27. Id.
28. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 71.
29. Id.
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All three cases were appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, which consolidated the claims. 30 A divided panel of the Elev-
enth Circuit found that the ADEA did not validly abrogate the states'
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. 31 Judge Edmondson stated
that the ADEA was improper because it lacked a clear statement of intent
to abrogate state sovereign immunity. 32 Judge Cox concurred with
Judge Edmondson but did not address "the thorny issue of Congress'
intent." 33 Judge Cox instead based his opinion on the fact that Congress
did not seem to enact the ADEA pursuant to any clear Fourteenth
Amendment violation. 34 Chief Judge Hatchett did not agree with either
judge's reasoning, finding instead that the ADEA contained a clear state-
ment of Congress' intent to abrogate state immunity and represented a
valid exercise of congressional power to abrogate those state rights. 35
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle the
issue of whether the ADEA was a valid exercise of congressional abro-
gation of state sovereign immunity among the divided circuit courts. 36
In affirming the decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court held that although Congress did intend to abrogate
state sovereign immunity in the enactment of the ADEA,37 it was not a
valid exercise of Congress' remedial powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 38
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Because the defendants in Kimel are state university and corrections
systems, they are considered an arm of the state government and
30. Id.; see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1428 (11th Cir. 1998). The United
States intervened in all three cases to defend the ADEA. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 71.
31. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 71; see also Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1449.
32. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 71; see also Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1430-31.
33. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 71; see also Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1445 (Cox, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
34. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 72; see also Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1446-47.
35. Petitioner's Brief at *10, Kimel (No. 98-791); see also Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1434 (Hatchett,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
36. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 72, cert. granted, 511 U.S. 1121 (1999). In the eight circuits that had ad-
dressed the issue, six held that the ADEA was a valid exercise of congressional power. See Cooper v.
N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 162 F.3d 770, 777 (2d Cir. 1998); Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d
1131, 1140 (10th Cir. 1998); Coger v. Bd. of Regents of the State of Tenn., 154 F.3d 296, 307 (6th Cir.
1998); Keeton v. Univ. of Nev. Sys., 150 F.3d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 1998); Scott v. Univ. of Miss., 148
F.3d 493, 503 (5th Cir. 1998); Goshtasby v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 141 F.3d 761, 772 (7th Cir.
1998). The other two circuits held that the abrogation was invalid. See Humenansky v. Regents of
Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822, 825-28 (8th Cir. 1998); Kimel, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 (11th Cir. 1998).
37. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73.
38. Id. at 91.
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therefore appropriately raised the issue of sovereign immunity as a bar
to being sued in federal court. 39
The issue of individual state power in our federalist system has been
contested for years; therefore a brief recapitulation of the cases leading
to the current status of state sovereign immunity in the Supreme Court is
in order.40
A. STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The doctrine of sovereign immunity dates back to England's policy
of the king being exempt from suits unless he consented to being sued.4 I
The Framers of the Constitution, however elected not to adopt this
principle that "the king can do no wrong" in the original United States
Constitution.42 Sovereign immunity for the individual states was not
explicitly incorporated into the Federal Constitution until after the
decision in Chisholm v. Georgia.43
1. The Supreme Court Recognizes the Need for
Explicit Sovereign Immunity for the States
Chisholm involved an individual's suit in assumpsit against the state
of Georgia to collect a debt related to the Revolutionary War.44 The
39. Id. at 66.
40. The limits of state power in a federalist system of government are inherently ambiguous be-
cause the governmental authority is split between the central federal government and the states. See
Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition
and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. R Ev. 543, 543-44 (1954). The true power lies
with the people, not the legislatures, and therefore changes in public opinion will affect the position of
the states in the federal power structure to some degree. Id. at 544. "The actual extent of central
intervention in the governance of our affairs [by the states] is determined far less by the formal power
distribution than by the sheer existence of the states and their political power to influence the action of
the national authority." Id.
41. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 457 (1793) (citing 1 WILLIAM B LACKSTONE, COM-
MENTrARmS * 241).
42. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 437-38; see also Forde 0. Fairchild, Case Note, United States Supreme
Court Refuses to Strip States of Their Sovereign Immunity in State Court, Alden v. Maine, 76 N.D. L.
REV. 659, 661 (2000) (summarizing arguments concerning state sovereign immunity made at the time
of the Constitution's ratification).
43. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793); see also Vicki Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amend-
ment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (1988); see also Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 452, 454,
471 (discussing the separate opinions of Justices Blair and Wilson, and Chief Justice Jay).
44. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 444. Assumpsit is a common law action for breach of contract. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 120 (7th ed., 1999). In 1779, Robert Farquhar, a Charleston, South Carolina
merchant, sold goods to the Georgia army for use in the Revolutionary War. See Doyle Mathis,
Chisholm v. Georgia: Background Settlement, in THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN HISTORY 19-21 (June
1967). The goods were not paid for at Farquhar's death in 1784. Id. In 1791, his executor, Alex-
ander Chisholm, unsuccessfully brought suit in the United States Circuit Court for the District of
Georgia. Id. at 21-22. Plaintiffs sought 100,000 pounds in sterling silver for payment of the debt plus
consequential damages. Id. at 22. Notably, Justice James Iredell, who later filed the famous
dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court's decision, heard the arguments at the district court level as a
traveling circuit judge. Id. at 23.
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United States Supreme Court decided that the State's claim of sovereign
immunity from suit was not supported by the Constitution. 45 In separate
opinions, a majority of the justices declared that the states had given up
their sovereignty when they adopted the Constitution and created a new
central government. 46 The majority also noted that the implied power of
the judiciary to decide suits against the states was broad enough to allow
the suit in question. 47
This decision included a noteworthy dissent by Justice Iredell, who
felt that sovereign immunity was a principle that was meant to be inher-
ently incorporated into the Constitution by the Framers due to their
reliance on the common law of England.4 8 Justice Iredell was of the
opinion that the purpose of the judiciary was to interpret existing law. 49
He explained that the legislature was the branch of government that
should be making new law and policy, not the judiciary.50 Because he
was unable to find any specific instance in the Constitution or other State
or federal law wherein the states had given up their immunity from suits
in federal courts, he was unwilling to agree that the State of Georgia
should be required to defend itself in court, even for the recovery of a
debt owed by a state. 51
2. The Eleventh Amendment is Officially Recognized and
Interpreted
The reaction to the Chisholm decision was "swift and hostile. '52
Within days of the announcement of the decision, Congress began
drafting the Eleventh Amendment.53 The Amendment was almost
unanimously adopted at the next congressional assembly. 54
Following this adoption the Court entertained virtually no chal-
lenges under the new amendment until 1890, when the Court was faced
45. William P. Marshall, Commentary: The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372, 1376 (1989). Interestingly, although Chishom did obtain
a judgment against Georgia in 1793, the claim was not settled until 1847. See Mathis, supra note 44, at
29.
46. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 450 (citing opinion of Blair, J.); Id. at 457 (citing opinion of Wilson, J.);
Id. at 468 (citing opinion of Cushing, J.); Id. at 471 (citing opinion of Jay, C.J.).
47. Id. at 451 (citing opinion of Iredell, J.); Id. at 464 (citing opinion of Wilson, J.); Id. at 467
(citing opinion of Cushing, J.); Id. at 465 (citing opinion of Jay, C.J.). All of the four majority opinions
focused on the fact that if the state could be a plaintiff in a suit in federal court, it was only fair that it
could also be a defendant in similar suits. Id. at 451, 464-65, 467.
48. Id. at 419, 429-50 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 433.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 434-35.
52. See Marshall, supra note 45, at 1377.
53. Id.; see also U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
54. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
496 [VOL. 77:491
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with Hans v. Louisiana.55 Hans involved a Louisiana citizen suing the
State of Louisiana for defaulting on bonds issued after the Civil War.56
Because this case arose under the Court's federal question jurisdiction, 57
it was a case of first impression. 58
The State of Louisiana ultimately prevailed in the suit, based on the
newly drafted Eleventh Amendment. 59 The Amendment granted states
immunity from civil suits brought by foreign citizens if the state had not
consented.60 The Hans decision expanded this idea to include resident
as well as foreign citizens and rested, not on the majority opinion in
Chisholm, but on Justice Iredell's dissent. 6 1 The Court declared that the
states could be sied for debts by individuals only if they consented to
being sued.62 However, the Court also noted that this was a fine line and
that the states would be held accountable if they attempted to invade
individual property rights that arose as a result of contracting with the
state.63
3. Modifications to the Doctrine of State Sovereign Immunity
Following Hans, the Court in 1908 modified the rule regarding state
immunity from suit in Ex parte Young.64 Minnesota Attorney General
Edward T. Young claimed that he was exempt from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment because he was acting in his official capacity as a
state official when he sought to enforce a state law that was later declared
unconstitutional. 65 The Court disagreed and stated that when Young
attempted to enforce an unconstitutional law he had acted beyond the
scope of his official duties. 66 Thus, the Young exception was born, de-
claring that a state official seeking to enforce a state law, which does not
55. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
56. Hans, 134 U.S. at 1.
57. Hans's suit was based on a violation of Article III of United States Constitution. Hans, 134
U.S. at 9; see also U.S. CONST. art. III., § 2, cl. 1.
58. Hans, 134 U.S. at 9. Note that Chisholm was based on the common law claim of assumpsit.
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 444 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting).
59. Hans, 134 U.S. at 20-21.
60. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
61. Hans, 134 U.S. at 12.
62. Id. at 20.
63. Id. at 20-21.
64. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
65. Young, 209 U.S. at 134. Young arose when the Minnesota legislature passed rate changes on
railroads traveling in the state. Id. at 127-29. The railroads challenged the rate changes as
unconstitutional and brought suit in the federal circuit court. Id. at 129. The circuit court then issued
an injunction, prohibiting the publication of rate changes as well as attempting to enforce the law in
any way. Id. at 132. When Attorney General Young filed a writ of mandamus to overturn the circuit
court decision, in direct violation of a restraining order against the state, he was charged with
contempt. Id. at 133-34.
66. Id. at 159-60.
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comport with the Federal Constitution, is not protected by Eleventh
Amendment immunity.67
In Ex Parte Young, the relief requested and granted was injunctive
relief. 68 In Edelman v. Jordan,69 the Court expanded the doctrine of
sovereign immunity exceptions to encompass cases also involving a
limited amount of monetary relief when the money damages are a direct
result of injunctive relief.70 The Court refused to allow the payment of
all monetary damages in general because the funds would have to be
paid from general state revenues, which would violate the Eleventh
Amendment. 71 The Court noted that although the payment of money
damages would have an ancillary effect on state revenues when connect-
ed with an injunctive award, this result was allowable whereas a direct
judgment against state revenues was not.72
Shortly after Edelman, the Court took a different approach to state
sovereign immunity challenges, by analyzing the basis for Congress'
power to abrogate rather than the available relief, when it decided
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. 73 In Fitzpatrick, a case involving a sex discrimina-
tion claim under The Civil Rights Act of 1966, the Court expanded
Congress' basis for usurping state sovereign immunity to include the
Civil War Amendments. 74 The Supreme Court looked closely at the
Fourteenth Amendment, which was undisputed as the source of
congressional power to abrogate state immunity under Title VII.75
Justice Rehnquist's opinion noted that the Civil War Amendments were
67. Id. at 167-68.
68. Id. at 132.
69. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
70. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 667-68. Edelman was a class action brought by state welfare recipient
John Jordan and others, who sued former employees of the Public Aid Department of the State of
Illinois for improper disbursement of federal-state aid programs for the aged, blind and disabled. Id.
at 653. Jordan requested retroactive benefits for the four-month period that the state wrongfully with-
held his benefits due to the state's improperly implementing the program in accordance with state,
rather than federal guidelines. Id. at 655-56.
71. Id. at 664-65.
72. Id. at 668. The distinction drawn here is the difference between actually removing existing
funds from the state treasury compared to preventing future monies from being collected by the state.
Id. at 665.
73. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
74. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 447-48; see also U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV. In Fitzpatrick, a
group of retired male employees of the State of Connecticut brought suit for sex-based discrimination
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1966. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 448-49. Justices
Brennan and Stevens filed concurring opinions. Id. at 457-58. Justice Brennan's opinion was based
on the belief that the states had surrendered their immunity when they adopted the Constitution. Id.
(Brennan, J. concurring). Justice Stevens also agreed in the outcome, but opined that congressional
commerce power was broad enough to abrogate state immunity in this case, and therefore the Four-
teenth Amendment was needlessly cited as the source of the congressional power to act. Id. at 458-60
(Stevens, J. concurring).
75. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 452-53.
498
2001] CASE COMMENT 499
adopted specifically to limit state power.76 Therefore, in adopting the
Civil War Amendments, the states had given up their Eleventh Amend-
ment right to sovereign immunity with respect to suits based on federal
laws that Congress passed pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 77
In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 78 a divided Court considered
both the remedy and basis for congressional action and determined that
imposing money damages for violation of federal environmental laws by
the states was an appropriate exercise of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause. 79 The Court looked to the legislative history and
plain language of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)80 and its amendment the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)81 to
first determine if the intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity under
these acts was clear.82
Finding that the intention to abrogate state immunity was clear, the
Court discussed whether Congress had the power to do so when it
enacted CERCLA under the Commerce Clause.83 The Court noted a list
76. Id. at 453-54.
77. Id. at 456.
78. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
79. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 23 (plurality opinion). Union Gas arose when the State of Pennsyl-
vania undertook a major flood control program and unleashed a deposit of coal tar into Broadhead
Creek. Id. at 5-6. The State was ordered to clean up the site pursuant to the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994 &
Supp. V 1999); see also Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5-6. The federal government had reimbursed the State
$720,000 for costs associated with cleaning up the site. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 6. The United States
sued Union Gas in order to recoup the amounts reimbursed to the State for clean up costs because
Union Gas was the prior owner of the property. Id. Union Gas then filed a third-party complaint
against the State, declaring that the State was negligent in the construction of its flood control project.
Id. Union Gas appealed when both the district court and court of appeals dismissed the case, claiming
that the State was immune and that there was no clear congressional intent to hold the states liable for
money damages under CERCLA. Id. Meanwhile, Congress amended CERLCA by passing the Super-
fund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). Id. As a result of the amendment, the
Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which
held that CERCLA, as amended by SARA, did clearly intend to subject the states to suit through the
power granted to Congress through the Commerce Clause. Id; see also United States v. Union Gas
Co., 832 F.2d 1343, 1345 (3d Cir. 1987).
80. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L.
96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
81. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
82. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 9-10. The statute specifically notes that the states shall not be subject
to suit for damages that arise out of an emergency situation involving the release or potential release
of hazardous substances, but that this "shall not preclude liability for costs or damages as a result of
gross negligence or intentional misconduct by the State or local government." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §
9607(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1998)). The Court rejected the argument that the plain language of the
statute did not provide for private entities' suits against the states, noting that this interpretation would
render another section of the Act as meaningless. Id. at 11 (referring to § 101(20)(D), concerning the
states' liability to "any nongovernmental entity").
83. Id. at 13.
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of prior cases where congressional power to abrogate Eleventh Amend-
ment state sovereign immunity-was found in the Commerce Clause. 84 It
then likened the case at hand to Fitzpatrick, wherein congressional abro-
gation power was found in the Fourteenth Amendment. 85 The Court
then compared the Commerce Clause with Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment because both clauses grant power to Congress and take
power from the states. 86 Because the two clauses were so similar, the
Court determined that both gave Congress the power to abrogate the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit.87 Therefore, CERCLA
was a valid exercise of this congressional power under the Commerce
Clause.88
This reasoning was rejected seven years later in Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida.89 In Seminole Tribe, the Court adopted a two-step
inquiry to determine whether state sovereign immunity had been validly
abrogated. 90 The first step required an "unequivocally" clear statement
of intent to revoke the state right.91 The second step demanded that
Congress had acted within a bona fide power to abrogate the right under
a specific provision in the United States Constitution. 92 The Court then
determined that Florida was immune from the suit, because although
Congress did "unequivocally express" its intention to abrogate the
states' immunity, 93 there was no power to do so within the Indian
Commerce Clause.94
84. Id. at 14-15 (citing Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 191 (1964);
Employees v. Mo. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 286 (1973); Welch v. Tex. Dep't of
Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 475-76 (1987); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of
N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 252 (1985)).
85. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 15-16; see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456-57 (1976).
86. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 16-17.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 19.
89. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
90. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55. Seminole Tribe involved The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,
25 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988), which required the tribes to contact and enter into an agreement with the
states in which the gaming would take place. Id. at 47. Under the Act, certain elements of the gaming
would be controlled by a compact between the state and the tribe. Id. at 48-49. The Act required the
states to negotiate the compact in good faith and gave the tribes the ability to bring claims in federal
court for a violation of this good faith requirement. Id. at 50. The Seminole Tribe took advantage of
that opportunity, bringing suit against the State of Florida, alleging that the State refused to negotiate
with regard to "inclusion of certain gaming activities" in its suit against the State. Id. at 51-52. The
State of Florida moved to dismiss because of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 52. The district
court denied the motion to dismiss, but the court of appeals reversed, stating that the source of the
congressional action at issue here was the Indian Commerce Clause, which does not give Congress the
power to abrogate state immunity. Id. at 52-53.
91. Id. (citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
92. Id. (citing Green, 474 U.S. at 68).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 47.
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In determining that there was no valid grant of power within the
Indian Commerce Clause, the Court noted that only in Union Gas had
the Court upheld congressional abrogation of the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity under this clause and that was a plurality
opinion. 95 The Court then agreed that the Tribe's analogy between the
Interstate Commerce Clause and the Indian Commerce Clause was fitting,
and overruled Union Gas to protect states' rights. 96 This effectively
meant that the Article I "Commerce Power" was invalid as a source for
congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity in federal court.97
On June 23, 1999, this rationale was extended to prevent the abro-
gation of state sovereign immunity in state courts in Alden v. Maine.98
The Alden Court addressed a challenge to the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA)99 arising out of a suit against the State of Maine by a group of
state corrections employees. 100
The provision of specific importance in Alden was the FLSA's pro-
vision that authorized suits against the states in their own courts without
regard to whether the state had consented to the suit. 101 The authority
cited in the FLSA was Article I, which had not previously been identi-
fied as a source of congressional authority for the abrogation of state
sovereign immunity in the state courts. 102 Following an analysis of
constitutional "[h]istory, practice, precedent, and . . . structure," 103 the
Court determined that Article I power did not grant Congress the right to
abrogate state sovereign immunity in the state's own courts unless the
state first agreed to be subject to suit in state court. 104 Since Maine did
not consent to the suit, the FLSA challenge was sustained. 105 This left
95. Id. at 59; see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1989).
96. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 60-62 (1996).
97. Id. at 72.
Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authority over a
particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits
by private parties against unconsenting States. The Eleventh Amendment restricts the
judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the
constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.
Id. at 72-73.
98. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
99. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 1, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
100. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 711-12 (1999). The workers claimed that the State had vio-
lated the overtime provisions in the FLSA. Id. at 711.
101. Id. at 712; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 203(x) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
102. Alden, 527 U.S. at 741.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 754, 759.
105. Id. at 759-60.
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only Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a valid source available
for congressional abrogation of state immunity.106
B. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT'S SECTION 5 ENFORCEMENT CLAUSE
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in part:
Section 1. . . No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. 107
Thus, if Congress finds that the states have violated the basic civil
rights mentioned in the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting state law,
Congress has the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity and over-
turn the state law under the enforcement power in Section 5. 108 When
challenges are made to the exercise of this power, the Court will look to
equal protection jurisprudence to determine the appropriate tests to ap-
ply to the state laws based on the rights being considered.109 If the rights
at issue are not "fundamental rights" or if the people treated unfairly
are not in a "suspect class," the state must only show that the means
used are "rationally related" to a "legitimate end" of government to
demonstrate that the state laws are appropriate under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 110
106. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65 (1996). "Never before the decision in
Union Gas had we suggested that the bounds of Article III could be expanded by Congress operating
pursuant to any constitutional provision other than the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
107. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §§ 1, 5.
108. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (ordering states to comply with
federal desegregation law); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (overturning state law
denying welfare benefits to illegal aliens); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (striking down
a state law denying voting rights to defendants convicted of "crimes of moral turpitude").
109. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1976) (recognizing that the
strict scrutiny test is not applicable if the state law does not infringe upon a fundamental right or impact
a suspect class of persons).
110. See generally Dandrige v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding state Aid to Families
With Dependent Children implementation scheme despite disparate impact on large families because
the state's rationale in capping benefits at $250 per month per family was reasonable); Vacco v. Quill,
521 U.S. 793 (1997) (affirming a state law prohibiting assisted suicide while permitting the refusal of
lifesaving medical treatment because the goal of protecting lives was rationally related to the means of
refusing to allow affirmative actions resulting in murder).
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"Fundamental" or "natural" rights are those rights that the Court
has determined that all people inherently possess and shall enjoy without
the interference of government.I I Some of the fundamental rights
which the Supreme Court has recognized are the right to vote, 112 the
right to interstate travel, 113 and various privacy rights, such as marriage
and the right to use contraception. 114 If state action threatens a funda-
mental right, the Court applies "strict scrutiny," its most stringent test, to
determine if the state law comports with the Constitution.' 1 5
Likewise, "strict scrutiny" is applied to those cases which target
individuals who are members of recognized "suspect classes."' 1 16 Sus-
pect classes include race,117 alienage, 1 8 and national origin.119 When the
Court applies strict scrutiny, it will strike down the challenged law unless
it is "necessary" to promote a "compelling" state interest, and all other
less intrusive means are ineffective. 120
Quasi-suspect classes are genderl2' and illegitimacy,1 22 and chal-
lenged laws based on these classifications face a mid-level review by the
Supreme Court. 123 When reviewing claims based on quasi-suspect classi-
fications, the Court requires that the law be "substantially related" to
S11. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312, n.3 (citing the right to vote, right of interstate travel, rights guaran-
teed by the First Amendment, and the right to procreate as fundamental rights).
112. Harper v. V.I. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1966) (disallowing poll tax as a
bar to fundamental right of voting).
113. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 643-44 (1969) (finding unconstitutional, state laws that
denied welfare assistance to residents who had resided in the state for less than one year as it was a
penalty to the fundamental right of interstate travel).
114. See generally Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (declaring marriage as a
fundamental right); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that abortions are protected under a
woman's fundamental right to privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding that the
right to use contraception is protected under the fundamental right to privacy).
115. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 544-45 (1942) (holding that strict scrutiny was warrant-
ed for state law requiring sterilization of some repeat criminal offenders).
116. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1944) (holding that race-based classifica-
tion triggered strict scrutiny because race is a suspect classification).
117. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967) (holding as suspect, racial classifications that re-
quire strict scrutiny).
118. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (using strict scrutiny to invalidate state law banning
children of illegal aliens from attending public school).
119. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-18 (subjecting state law targeting persons of Japanese ancestry
to strict scrutiny).
120. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 643-44 (1969) (invalidating state laws requiring one-
year residency requirement before welfare benefits could be received partly due to the fact that the
waiting period was more restrictive than a proposed individualized case-by-case analysis of new
residents' need for welfare benefits).
121. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729-30 (1982) (sustaining challenge to
women-only admissions policy under intermediate scrutiny review).
122. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 465 (1988) (using intermediate scrutiny to overturn six-year
statute of limitations for support of illegitimate children).
123. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985) (explaining the tests
used for various equal protection classes and why the district court's classifying the characteristic of
mental retardation as quasi-suspect was in error).
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an "important government interest" in order to pass Constitutional
muster. 124
Cases which do not involve suspect or quasi-suspect classes or funda-
mental rights undergo rational basis review. 125 Rational basis scrutiny
requires that the state law in question be "rationally related" to some
legitimate state goal.1 26  In many of the early equal protection cases
applying rational review, the Court gave deference to the legislature,
assuming that its goals were legitimate. 127
One of these cases wherein the Court applied rational review was
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia.128 Robert Murgia was a
police officer who waged an equal protection challenge on a state law
mandating retirement for police officers after age fifty.129 In a per
curiam decision, the Court refused to find that age discrimination claims
should be subjected to anything more than rational basis scrutiny. 130
The Massachusetts statute was upheld because "where rationality is the
test, a State 'does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because
the classifications made by its laws are imperfect."' 131
In 1979, the Court again gave deference to Congress in Vance v.
Bradley, 132 another age discrimination case involving a mandatory retire-
ment provision for foreign service personnel under the Federal Foreign
Service Act. 133 The Court stated that the classification here was pre-
sumably reasonable because it was not unreasonable to set higher




126. Id. (describing the general rule for equal protection claims and the exception to the rule
when the cases deal with classifications based on race, alienage or national origin).
127. See generally Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (upholding a
state law banning solicited advertising on delivery trucks yet allowing advertising of company-owned
products and services on company-owned trucks because the "local authorities may well have con-
cluded that those who advertise their own wares on their trucks do not present the same traffic
problem in view of the nature or extent of the advertising which they use"); Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1955) (upholding different treatment of opticians based on public health
concerns); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 478 (1980) (upholding congressional spending pro-
gram which required minority contractors because Congress had enough historical basis to conclude
that minority contractors needed protection from discrimination).
128. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
129. Murgia, 427 U.S at 309.
130. Id. at 314. The district court considered strict scrutiny the appropriate test because the
compulsory retirement at age fifty was considered irrational. Id. "[Elven old age does not define a
'discrete and insular' group, in need of 'extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
processes.' Instead, it marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our normal span." Id. at
313-14 (citing United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)).
131. Id. at 316 (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)).
132. 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
133. Vance, 440 U.S. at 94-95; see also 22 U.S.C. § 1002 (1976) (repealed 1980).
134. Vance, 440 U.S. at 101.
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This "blind deference" to Congress would not last, however, as was
noted most clearly in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.135 Cleburne
involved a challenge to a city zoning ordinance which prohibited the
establishment of group homes for the mentally retarded in certain
residential zones.136 The Court noted that rational review was the ap-
propriate standard of scrutiny in affirming the court of appeals' invalida-
tion of the ordinance.137 Rational review was appropriate because the
characteristic of mental retardation was not the basis for a suspect or
quasi-suspect classification warranting heightened scrutiny.1 38 Instead of
deferring to the legislature's decision, however, the Court took the lead
of the district court in examining the unstated reasons behind the
ordinance. 139 In looking at the language of the law itself, specifically
what was contained and what was absent, the Court determined that the
rationale supporting the ordinance was not reasonable in light of the
other factors present in the case.140
In sum, the Court will scrutinize Fourteenth Amendment claims
under rational review scrutiny unless the classifications are considered
suspect or involve a fundamental right.' 4 1 As a result of Cleburne,
however, the Court has looked more closely at legislative intent even in
cases where rational review scrutiny is warranted. 142 This closer inspec-
tion of legislative history has become even more central to the Court's
analysis when the party being sued is a state or state entity claiming
protection under the Eleventh Amendment.143
135. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
136. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442.
137. Id. at 435. The court of appeals determined that mental retardation was a quasi-suspect
class, and therefore the law at issue should be subjected to a heightened standard of review. Id. at
437-38. Had mental retardation been classified as a quasi-suspect class, the Court would have had to
examine the law to determine if it was substantially related to an important government interest. Id.
138. Id. at 442-43. In concluding that mental retardation was not a quasi-suspect class, the Court
noted four reasons for its decision. Id. at 442-46. First, the condition of mental retardation is a com-
plex one, which is best dealt with by those state legislators and other qualified professionals who are
familiar with its issues. Id. at 442-43. Second, "the Federal Government has not only outlawed
discrimination against the mentally retarded in federally funded programs, but it has also provided the
retarded with the right to receive 'appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation' in a setting that is
'least restrictive of [their] personal liberty."' Id. at 443 (citing the Developmental Disabilities
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6010(1), (2) (1984)). Third, the mentally retarded are
not powerless in government; they have much public support in the legislature. Id. at 445. Finally, the
Court did not want to expand the classes already established because it would be nearly impossible to
ascertain if the mentally retarded were more qualified for heightened judicial scrutiny than other
classes similarly situated, such as the aged, mentally infirm, etc. Id. at 445-46.
139. Id. at 448-50.
140. Id. The facts show that the zoning ordinance for that section did allow for boarding houses,
hospitals, and other multiple dwelling structures, and the city failed to show how the residents of a
group home facility would pose any greater threat "to the city's legitimate interests" than the residents
of a group home for the mentally retarded. Id. at 449.
141. Id. at 440.
142. Id. at 448-50; see also City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530-32 (1997).
143. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996) (stating that whether a state has
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C. CASES INVOLVING BOTH THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
In City of Boerne v. Flores,144 the Court not only refused to give
blind deference to Congress, but it set a precedent of looking more
closely at the aims behind the legislation before deciding the fate of
federal laws under a Fourteenth Amendment challenge. 145 After the
Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith,146 Con-
gress reacted by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA).147 The city of Boerne, Texas, was later sued by a local church
under RFRA for its decision not to grant the church a requested building
permit.148
The Court reviewed Congress' stated Fourteenth Amendment autho-
rity for enacting RFRA. 149 It determined that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment power was intended to remedy specific acts of past injury and was
limited to only "enforcing" the provisions of the amendment. 150 The
Court then considered the contention that RFRA did not remedy an un-
constitutional action but instead altered the meaning of what established
a constitutional violation. 151 In determining whether RFRA did cross the
fine line between enforcement and alteration of the Constitution, the
Court stated, "[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end."15 2 This "congruence and proportionality test" was then applied
to the city's actions. 153
constructively abrogated its sovereign immunity must be obvious in the legislative history of the law
being considered); see also Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (noting that Congress must have
passed the legislation at issue under a valid grant of power).
144. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
145. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534-35.
146. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
147. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994)). The Court in Employment Div. v. Smith held that the states could regulate
religious practices which are protected by the First Amendment if the laws are neutral and generally
applied. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. The religious practice being regulated in Smith was the use of
peyote, a psychedelic drug. Id. at 874. RFRA prevented the states from enacting such laws unless
they could pass the heightened scrutiny tests under equal protection jurisprudence, despite the fact that
the right to religious practice was not a recognized fundamental right. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at
534-35.
148. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512. The city denied the request because the church was
located in a newly designated historic landmark district. Id.
149. Id. at 516-17.
150. Id. at 519. (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966)).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 520.
153. Id. at 529. This test became a pivotal test in later cases involving Congress' enactment of
legislation pursuant to its Section 5 Fourteenth Amendment power. See e.g., United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 625-26 (2000) (subjecting the Violence Against Women Act to the test); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639-40 (1999) (considering the
Patent Remedy Act under this test); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82-86 (1999) (applying
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In concluding that RFRA was not an appropriate exercise of Con-
gress' remedial Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power, the Court
compared RFRA to the Voting Rights Act. 154 The Court looked to the
legislative history of the two acts to determine what circumstances
prompted the two laws. 155 It found that there was ample evidence of
violations of the fundamental right to vote by the states before the
enactment of the Voting Rights Act; however, evidence of the states'
violating individuals' religious freedom rights was not so clear in enact-
ing RFRA.156 Therefore, the Court determined that RFRA was not a
proper remedial exercise under the Fourteenth Amendment's enforce-
ment clause. 157
The Court again affirmed states' rights under a Section 5 Four-
teenth Amendment challenge in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educa-
tion Expense Board v. College Savings Bank. 158 The Florida Prepaid
decision addressed a sovereign immunity challenge brought under the
Patent Remedy Act.159 When it was conceded that the Act was enacted
pursuant to congressional Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power,
the Court considered whether the Act was a valid exercise of that
the test to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121
S. Ct. 955, 962-63 (2001) (using the test on the Americans with Disabilities Act).
154. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997); see also Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308-15.
155. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-3 1; see also Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308-15.
156. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-32.
157. Id. at 536.
158. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
159. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 630; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (1994). College Savings
Bank, a New Jersey chartered bank, held a patent on a financing scheme for funding college
education. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 630-31. The scheme involved annuity contracts that were
purchased to fund future education costs for college students. Id. at 630. The State of Florida created
the Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board (Florida Prepaid), a state agency which
provided tuition prepayment contracts for state residents similar to those provided by College Savings
Bank. Id. at 631. College Savings Bank brought a patent infringement suit against Florida Prepaid in
the Federal District Court of New Jersey under the newly enacted Patent and Plant Variety Protection
Remedy Clarification Act (Plant Remedy Act). Id.; see also Patent and Plant Variety Protection
Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2582
(1994 & Supp. V 1999)). College Savings Bank also brought a claim under the Trademark Act of
1946 (Lanham Act), alleging that Florida Prepaid had violated this act by making false claims about its
own product. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 633, n.1; see also Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)). The district court dismissed
the Lanham Act claim, but sustained the Plant Remedy Act claim, which formed the basis for Florida
Prepaid. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 633. College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board was a companion case to Florida Prepaid arising out of the same set of
operative facts under the Lanham Act. 527 U.S. 666, 670-72 (1999). College Savings Bank appealed
the district court's dismissal of the Lanham Act claim. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 671. Although the
Lanham Act was enacted pursuant to Congress' Article I powers, the Fourteenth Amendment was
considered as a possible alternate source of power because the rights at issue were arguably property
rights. Id. at 672-73. The Court found neither the freedom from false advertising about one's product
by a competitor, nor the right to be secure in one's business qualified as a Fourteenth Amendment
property right. Id. at 672. Therefore the Fourteenth Amendment was rejected as a valid source for
the congressional action at issue. Id. at 675.
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power.160 After recognizing that patents were property within the mean-
ing of the Due Process Clause, the Court considered whether the means
used to protect this property were "congruent and proportional" to
remedy past constitutional violations. 16 1  In examining the legislative
history of the Act, the Court found no widespread violation of patents by
states that would require complete abrogation of state sovereign im-
munity under the Patent Remedy Act. 162 Consequently, because the law
was not an appropriate remedial act under the Fourteenth Amendment,
the abrogation of state sovereign immunity under the Patent Remedy Act
was held invalid.163
As a result of the foregoing, it was clear that the Supreme Court
would view subsequent congressional attempts to abrogate state immuni-
ty with suspicion. 164 Congressional power to abrogate state immunity
must come only from the powers granted in Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and nowhere else in the Constitution, 165 it must be exercised
to remedy a specific past Fourteenth Amendment violation,166 and the
means used must be congruent and proportional to the injury to be
remedied.167 Therefore, in future cases, the Court's inquiry into the state
sovereign immunity challenge would center on the "history, practice,
precedent and ... structure" 168 of the legislation and the Constitution.
IV. ANALYSIS
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, Justice O'Connor authored
the majority opinion, which held that the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA) was not a proper exercise of Congressional remedial
160. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635-37. Congress also cited the Patent Clause and Commerce
Clause which are both found in Article I as sources of power with which to abrogate state immunity.
Id.
161. Id. at 637-40.
162. Id. at 642-43. In fact, the record indicated only two instances where a state had infringed
upon a private patent and had resulted in claims being filed in court. Id. at 640 (citing H.R. REP. No.
101-960, pt. 1, at 38 (1990)).
163. Id. at 647-48.
164. Id.
165. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65 (1996).
166. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966)).
167. Id. at 520.
168. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 741 (1999).
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Fourteenth Amendment power to abrogate state sovereign immunity.169
Justice Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, stating that the power given to Congress was not so limited as the
Court suggested and calling for a repeal of the overruling of Union
Gas.170 Justice Thomas also concurred in part and dissented in part,
stating that the ADEA did not validly abrogate state immunity because
Congress did not make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute. 17 1
A. MAJORITY OPINION
The Court began its analysis with an examination of various sections
of the ADEA and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), to determine the
exact changes made when Congress extended the application of the law
to state and local government employers through the ADEA's 1974
amendments.1 7 2 It then looked to the history of the case at hand 17 3 and
addressed two issues: whether Congress clearly intended to abrogate state
sovereign immunity, and, if so, whether this abrogation was a proper
exercise of Congress' power under the Constitution. 174
1. Congressional Intent
With respect to the intent of Congress, the Court noted the require-
ment that Congress must make its intent to abrogate state sovereign
immunity with an unmistakably clear statement. 17 5 Kimel and the other
169. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66 (2000). The majority opinion was split into
four parts. Id. at 65. Parts I, II, and IV were joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia,
Thomas and Kennedy. Id. Part III was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Scalia,
Souter, Ginsberg and Breyer. Id. Justice Stevens wrote an opinion dissenting in part and concurring in
part, which Justices Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer joined. See id. at 92 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas also filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part, which Justice Kennedy joined. See id. at 99 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
170. Id. at 92-97.
171. Id. at 99..
172. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 67-69. Two of the changes the Court recognized in the ADEA and
incorporated sections of the FLSA applied to the extension of covered employees. Id. at 67.
Originally, the ADEA applied to workers aged forty to sixty-five. Id. Following the 1974 amendment,
all employees aged forty and older were covered by the Act. Id. Additionally, the original statute
specifically exempted public employees. Id. at 68. After the 1974 Amendments, both state and
federal government employees were granted protection under the Act. Id. However, exceptions
were made to exempt a few selected groups. Id. State and local elected officials and appointed
policymakers are not covered as they are exempted from the definition of employees within the Act.
Id; see also 29 U.S.C. § 630(0 (1994). Mandatory age limits for federal, state and local law
enforcement officials and firefighters are also exempted under the Act. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 68; see also
5 U.S.C. § 3307(d), (e) (1994); 29 U.S. C. § 6230) (Supp. V 1999).
173. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 69-72.
174. Id. at 73.
175. Id. (citing Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989)).
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petitioners contended that this intent was found in the provisions regard-
ing the enforcement clauses, as well as the definition and extension of
the law to public agencies. 176
The State argued that the ADEA failed to clearly state its intention
to abrogate state immunity for two reasons. 177 The first reason centered
on the enforcement provisions found in the ADEA and FLSA.178 The
FLSA, which had its own enforcement provision, and the ADEA were
both amended by the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974 (1974
Amendments).179 While the provision in the FLSA clearly showed Con-
gress' intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity, the ADEA provision
did not, so it was therefore argued that Congress did not intend to abro-
gate state immunity in the ADEA provision. 180 The Court rejected this
argument, stating that because the ADEA provision specifically stated
176. Id. at 74. Section 626(b) provides that the provisions of the ADEA are to be enforced in
conjunction with the FLSA provisions at §§ 21 1(b), 216 (except for subsections (a) thereof), and 217.
29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994). Section 216(b) explicitly allows private individuals to sue the states under
this Act. Id. § 216(b) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
Section 211(b) provides that the United States Secretary of Labor may use the state labor
agencies to help the federal authorities carry out their duties. Id. § 211 (b) (1994). The state agencies
may not be utilized without the consent of the individual states, and the state agencies and employees
should be compensated adequately for their services. Id. This provision, requiring that state labor
agencies may be called by the federal labor department for assistance in the enforcement of the
ADEA, shows that Congress intended that the states should be aware of all of the provisions provided
therein, including § 216 which specifically provides for suits against public agencies. Id.
Section 216 states that the damages for violations of §§ 206 or 207 of this title shall include back
pay or other legal or equitable relief that may be appropriate. Id. § 216(b). The statute specifies that
the employers who are required to adhere to this law include public agencies and that suits alleging
violations of this title shall be maintained "in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction." Id.
The language of congressional intent to abrogate state immunity is clear here, when the law
specifically provides for suits against public agencies, which have been defined as "the Government
of the United States; the government of a State or political subdivision thereof; any agency of the
United States (including the United States Postal Service and Postal Rate Commission), a State, or a
political subdivision of a State; or any interstate governmental agency." Id. § 203(x) (1994 & Supp. V
1999).
Section 217 provides that the United States district courts shall have jurisdiction with regard to
injunctions associated with claims arising under this Title. Id. § 217 (1994). This provision clearly
shows congressional intent to abrogate state immunity when viewed in connection with § 216's clear
statement of a right to bring suit against public agencies. d § 216(b).
177. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 74.
178. Id. The enforcement provision in the ADEA is found at 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). The FLSA's
enforcement provision is found at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Kimel, 528 U.S. at 74.
179. Id. at 68; see also Fair Labor Standard Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
180. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 74. Originally, the ADEA provided that suits for back pay could be
maintained by employees "against any employer (including a public agency)" in any court of
competent jurisdiction. Id. (citing 29 U.S. C. § 626(b)). This provision did not specify that these suits
could be maintained if the states did not consent to being sued. Id. at 74. When the Act was amended
in 1974, it incorporated § 216(b) from the FLSA, which specifically provided for suits against the
unconsenting states, as well as § 203(x) which defines "public agency" to include state and local
government officials. Id. at 7-3-74. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 203(x) (1994)).
510
CASE COMMENT
that the FLSA provision would be incorporated into the ADEA, all of the
attributes of the FLSA provision were present in the ADEA provision. 181
Second, the State contended that the phrase "court of competent
jurisdiction" was ambiguous. 182 It argued that this phrase could be con-
strued to only provide for suits against those states that had consented to
being sued, not all states. 183 This argument relied on the Kennecott
Copper Corp. v. State Tax Commissioner1 84 decision.185
The Court determined that the phrase in Kimel was distinguishable
from the exact same one in Kennecott Copper based on the accompany-
ing language of the statute. 186 The Utah statute in Kennecott Copper did
not refer to federal courts anywhere in the Act. 187 Conversely, § 216(b),
which was clearly incorporated into the ADEA provisions, clearly stated
that individuals could sustain ADEA claims against the states in federal
or state courts; therefore, there was no ambiguity as to what courts were
appropriate in Kimel. 188
The Court then addressed Justice Thomas' dissent and refused to
find the phrase "court of competent jurisdiction" ambiguous, based on
the time delays involved in the enactment of the ADEA, the incorporated
references to the FLSA, and the subsequent amendments to both Acts. 189
The Court noted that what was important was "what" was enacted, not
"when" the changes were made. 190 It also noted that Congress must
have been aware of the consequences of incorporating the FLSA provi-
sions into the ADEA because both acts were amended as a result of the
same act in 1976.191
181. Id. at 75.
182. Id. The basis for this argument is summarized in the Court's statement, "for over a century
now, we have made clear that the Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits
against nonconsenting States." Id. at 73. Presumably then, a court in which the defendant state has not
surrendered its sovereign immunity is not "competent" to hear the case. Id. at 75.
183. Id.
184. 327 U.S. 573 (1946).
185. Kennecott Copper, 327 U.S. at 579-80. Kennecott Copper involved a citizen suing the State
of Utah in federal court under state law for recovery of a mining tax that was paid under protest by
the citizen. Id. at 574-75. The state law provided that citizens could bring suit for the refund of taxes
paid under protest "in any court of competent jurisdiction." Id. at 578 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. §
80-11-11 (1933), amended by § 59-2-1411 (repealed 1988)). The Court in Kennecott Copper noted
that only state courts were to be included under this phrase because the states have no power to affect
the procedures of federal court. Id.
186. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 75 (2000).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 75-76.
189. Id. at 77-78. The specific arguments made by Justice Thomas are discussed in Part IV.C.
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
190. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 76.
191. Id. Justice Thomas' argument relied on a clause in § 216(b), which excepted § 216(c) as a
source of enforcement procedure for the ADEA. Id. at 99 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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2. Congressional Authority
Next, the Court turned to the question of whether the 1974 exten-
sion of the ADEA to state and local employers was a valid exercise of
constitutional congressional power.192 The Court noted that it had con-
sidered this question in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) v. Wyoming,193 wherein the ADEA was adjudged a valid exercise
of constitutional Commerce Clause power. 194 Since the decision in Semi-
nole Tribe and the subsequent decisions in Alden, Florida Prepaid, and
College Savings Bank, the Court has rejected Article I of the Federal
Constitution as a source for congressional power to abrogate state im-
munity.195 The Court adhered to this precedent, despite Justice Stevens'
contention that the cases since Hans have been decided wrongly because
Congress inherently has the power to abrogate state immunity through
the fundamental aspects of federalism and that citing a specific Constitu-
tional enforcement provision granting such power is unnecessary. 196
Consequently, the Court stated that the ADEA would be considered in-
valid if it is not appropriate legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 197
Discussing Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, specifically the
decision and circumstances surrounding City of Boerne and its congru-
ence and proportionality test," was the Court's next step.198 It then
192. Id. at76.
193. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
194. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 76 (2000) (citing EEOC, 460 U.S. at 243); see
also U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
195. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 78; see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 731 (1999) (rejecting the argu-
ment that Article I gives Congress the right to abrogate state sovereign immunity even when read in
conjunction with the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636 (1999) (Patent Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8);
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 672 (1999) (U.S.
Const. art. I). The Court briefly mentioned its decision in College Savings Bank to overrule the con-
structive waiver rule. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 79 (citing Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 683). The constructive
waiver rule allowed Congress to enact laws based on its Article I commerce power, and successfully
argue that the states had "constructively waived" their sovereign immunity when they complied with
these laws, despite the fact that they had made no specific statement of their intention to surrender
their sovereign immunity. Id. (citing Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co. of Ala. Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184,
192 (1964)). The continuation of the constructive waiver doctrine was prohibited in College Savings
Bank because it would allow Congress to circumvent Seminole Tribe's holding that Congress cannot
abrogate state sovereign immunity using its Article I Commerce Clause power. Id. (citing Coll. Say.
Bank, 527 U.S. at 683).
196. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 79-80. See also id. at 92-99 (Stevens, J. dissenting). Justice Stevens
noted, "In my opinion, Congress' power to authorize federal remedies against state agencies that
violate federal statutory obligations is coextensive with its power to impose those obligations on the
States in the first place. Neither the Eleventh Amendment nor the doctrine of sovereign immunity
places any limit on that power." Id. at 93.
197. Id. at 80.
198. Id. City of Boerne identified that "fine line" between enacting remedial legislation under the
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applied the congruence and proportionality test to the ADEA and deter-
mined that the ADEA was inappropriate because the Act's substantive
requirements were disproportionate to any identified unconstitutional
conduct by the states. 199 Most of the time, age discrimination by state
and local employers is not unconstitutional because the classification will
usually withstand lower scrutiny than is required by the ADEA.200
The Court relied on Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Mur-
gia,2O1 Vance v. Bradley,20 2 and Gregory v. Ashcroft,20 3 which all held
that age was not a suspect class in terms of Fourteenth Amendment discri-
mination. 204 Those cases refused to find that generalized classifications
based on age were unconstitutional. 20 5 Based on this precedent, the
Court again affirmed its holding that age is not a suspect or quasi-
suspect class in terms of equal protection under the Constitution.20 6
The Court determined that the ADEA was out of proportion with
equal protection jurisprudence because its prohibitions were over-
broad.207 Petitioners unsuccessfully argued that with the two specified
exceptions included in the ADEA, it was not overbroad. 208 The first of
these exceptions allowed employers to depend on age classifications
only when age is "a bona fide occupational qualification" which is vital
to the standard operation of the employer's business. 209
Fourteenth Amendment and actually expanding the meaning of the amendment. Id. at 81 (citing City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997)). The congruence and proportionality test was
adopted because the Court recognized that "the same language that serves as the basis for the
affirmative grant of congressional power [to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth
Amendment] also serves to limit that power." Id. The Court then noted Florida Prepaid, wherein the
"congruence and proportionality" test was again implemented to invalidate state sovereign immunity
under the Patent Remedy Act. Id. at 82 (citing Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635-36).
199. Id. at 83.
200. Id. "Age classifications, unlike governmental conduct based on race or gender, cannot be
characterized as 'so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws
grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy."' Id. (citing Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)).
201. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
202. 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
203. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
204. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000).
205. Id. The Court noted that equal protection challenges based on age discrimination are
particularly difficult because the challengers bear the burden of showing that the state's classification
based on age is irrational. Id. at 84 (citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991)). Rational basis review does not require perfection, thus this
burden is particularly substantial and challenges usually do not prevail. Id.
206. Id. at 83.
207. Id. at 86. "Judged against the backdrop of our equal protection jurisprudence, it is clear that
the ADEA is 'so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be
understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior."' Id. (citing City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997)).
208. Id. at 86-87. The exceptions cited for this argument are located at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1)
(1994). The statute states in part that it is lawful for an employer to take action which would otherwise
be prohibited "where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of the particular business, or where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other
than age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).
209. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 67. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1)).
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Western Air Lines Inc. v. Criswell210 was decided by the Court using
the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception. 2 11 The
Court noted that the BFOQ exception can only succeed if the employer
can demonstrate that there is a "substantial basis for believing that all or
nearly all employees above an age lack the qualifications required for
the position" or that it is nearly impossible to determine which employ-
ees are not qualified without using the classification.2 1 2 This "reason-
able necessity" standard adopted by the ADEA is more akin to
heightened scrutiny under equal protection jurisprudence than the
rational basis scrutiny required in cases where classifications are based
on age.213 Because age is not a classification warranting heightened
scrutiny, the BFOQ provision is unconstitutionally overbroad. 214
The second exception listed under § 623(f)(1) is the reasonableness
exception. 215 Under this provision, employers are allowed to act in a
manner which would otherwise violate the ADEA when the "differ-
entiation is based on reasonable factors other than age." 216 This was in
direct opposition to holdings in Bradley, Gregory, and Murgia, which
expressly allowed the states to make generalizations based on age.2 17
The language of the ADEA thus raised age discrimination to a height-
ened level of scrutiny under equal protection, which is an exercise the
Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected.218
210. 472 U.S. 400(1985).
211. Western Air Lines, 472 U.S. at 423. Western Air Lines ultimately determined that a manda-
tory retirement provision at age sixty for flight engineers was not covered under the BFOQ defense
because individualized determinations of health could less restrictively help Western Air Lines attain
its goal of safely transporting its passengers than a generalized retirement age policy. id.
212. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 87 (quoting Western Air Lines, 472 U.S. at 422-23). The Court noted that
the BFOQ defense was intended as a very narrow exception within the ADEA. Id. (citing Western Air
Lines, 472 U.S. at 412). To successfully use the BFOQ defense, the employer must show that it is
highly impractical to assess each employee individually or that there is a substantial basis for the belief
that "all or nearly all employees" over a certain age are unable to perform the required work tasks
satisfactorily. Id. (citing Western Air Lines, 472 U.S. at 422-23).
213. Id. at 86-87 (citing Western Air Lines, 472 U.S. at 419). The Court noted that the ADEA
makes the State's use of age classifications prima facie unlawful, because it requires employers to
evaluate on the basis of employee performance, not age, even though it is constitutionally permissible
to evaluate employees based on age if the classification is rationally related to an important state
interest. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994) and Western Air Lines, 472 U.S. at 422); see also
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985).
214. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 87-88.
215. Id. at 88.
216. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1994)). The Court here noted that this provision pro-
hibited the use of age as a proxy for other characteristics of the employee, such as using age as a
reason for dismissal when the employee's dismissal is actually based on productivity. Id. at 88 (citing
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993)). However, the Constitution allows the states to
use age as a "proxy" for an employee's other undesirable characteristics. Id. (citing Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991), Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108-09 (1979), and Mass. Bd. of
Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314-17 (1976)).
217. Id.
218. Id.; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (holding that the
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The Court then moved to the next phase of the congruence and pro-
portionality test: whether the ADEA was appropriate remedial legisla-
tion. 219  When previously faced with this question, the Court has often
looked to the congressional record. 220  In examining the legislative
history of the ADEA, the Court found no pattern of age discrimination
by the states, nor did it find that there was any pattern of unconstitutional
age discrimination in the general public. 221
The Court also found that the evidence provided by Petitioners
consisted of isolated sentences clipped from reports and debates, rather
than a more comprehensive and complete record. 222  The main report
Petitioners relied on was a 1966 California report that found no uncon-
stitutional age discrimination violations in that state.223 Those violations
mentioned in the report were mostly found in police and fire depart-
ments, and those areas have traditionally been found to be places where
age discrimination is allowed even on the state level.2 24 The Court also
noted that the California report defined a state problem, not a national
problem that would require a federal remedy. 225 Furthermore, the report
concentrated on age discrimination in the private sector, but the Court
considered this inadequate to support the legislation regulating the
states. 226 Based on this information gathered from the private sector, the
Court said that Congress had no reason to believe that state and local
governments were discriminating on the basis of age. 227
The Court concluded by stating that the fact that state employees
were no longer able to sue their employers in federal court did not mean
that the "courthouse door was completely barred" to those employ-
ees. 228 In fact, all the states have enacted age discrimination statutes,
most of which allow for suit against public entities.2 29
classification based on religious practices to the scrutiny level of a suspect class was invalid).
219. Id. at 88-89.
220. Id. at 89; see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 640-45 (1999); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-31. "The appropriateness of remedial
measures must be considered in light of the evil presented.... Strong measures appropriate to address
one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one." City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530;
see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
221. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 90 (2000).
222. Id. The Court noted that although there had been several instances of age discrimination
noted in "a decade's worth of congressional reports and floor debates," those reports simply did not
point to violations by the state that rose to the level of constitutional violation. Id.
223. Id. at 90; see also Hearings on H.R. 3651 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 90th Cong. 161-201 (1967).
224. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90. Specifically, age discrimination in the areas of law enforcement and
fire fighting was allowed not only by California state law, but also by the ADEA. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 90-91.
228. Id. at 91-92.
229. Id.
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B. JUSTICE STEVENS' CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT
Justice Stevens' dissent began by stating that congressional com-
merce power includes the regulation of labor in the private and public
sectors.230 Justice Stevens found no limits on federal power to regulate
labor by either the Eleventh Amendment or the "judge-made" doctrine
of state sovereign immunity. 231 He stated that the judiciary is not the
guardian of state sovereign immunity, but rather our system of checks
and balances, through state representation in federal government, guaran-
tees the rights of the states. 232
Justice Stevens suggested that congressional acts are enacted against
a backdrop of state law, similar to the enactment of state law against the
backdrop of common law.233 Congress is comprised of representatives
elected by the states, who bring public opinion from the states to the
floor of the legislature when enacting federal laws. 234 Thus, in our
federalist system of government, any action taken by Congress can only
be completed with the cooperation of representatives of the people from
the various states. 235
Through the state representatives, the people have given the federal
legislature all the power it possesses. 236 This includes the power to enact
legislation that will seem adverse to some states because the enacting of
federal law is the end result of balancing the interests of the several
states. 237 Under Justice Stevens' view, if Congress has the power to
create a federal right against the states, it must also have the power to
provide a remedy in federal courts, "even if it is necessary to 'abrogate'
230. Id. at 92-93 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens stated
that because Congress had the power to enact legislation regulating labor issues such as health and
safety standards, minimum hours and wages, and age discrimination, it must also have the power to
provide a forum to decide disputes based on these laws in federal courts. Id.
231. Id. at 93.
232. Id.; see also Wechsler, supra note 40, at 558-60. Justice Stevens also noted that the doctrine
of state sovereign immunity is not a part of the Constitution but that it is "judge-made" law. Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 93 (2000); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 761-814 (1999)
(Souter, J., dissenting).
233. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 94 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, when Congress makes a federal law, it
is often codifying several state laws on a national level. Id. at 93-94; see also Wechsler, supra note
40, at 546.
234. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 93-94 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 291 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter
ed., 1961)); see also Wechsler, supra note 40, at 546.
235. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 94 n.l.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 94. Justice Stevens noted that when Congress enacts laws regulating state action it is
safe to assume that the implications on the states have been weighed heavily in the deliberations
leading to the statute's passage. Id. at 96. The burdens imposed on the states necessarily include the
costs of resolving disputes based on the enforcement of the laws. Id.
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the Court's 'Eleventh Amendment' version of the common-law defense
of sovereign immunity to do so."238
Justice Stevens concluded by asserting that Union Gas was decided
correctly, and that Seminole Tribe was not controlling law. 239 This asser-
tion was based on the fact that stare decisis means less in constitutional
law when there is a single controlling document to guide judicial deci-
sions, rather than just a series of past decisions. 240 He also asserted that
those cases following Seminole Tribe, specifically the trio of cases
decided on June 23, 1999, Alden, Florida Prepaid, and College Savings
Bank, should not be followed.24 1
C. JUSTICE THOMAS' CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT
In his partial concurrence and partial dissent, Justice Thomas stated
that the ADEA showed no "unmistakably clear statement" of congres-
sional intent to abrogate state immunity. 242 First, Justice Thomas looked
at the "person aggrieved" phrase, and determined that it must extend to
state employees, because it extended to any employee, and a state em-
ployee would certainly be considered "any employee." 243 However,
there was no such clear statement of a right against a state incorporated
in the Act.244
238. Id. at 97. "[O]nce Congress has made its policy choice, [to supplant state law with a federal
law] the sovereignty concerns of the several States are satisfied, and the federal interest in
evenhanded enforcement of federal law, explicitly endorsed in Article VI of the Constitution, does not
countenance further limitations." Id. at 96.
239. Id. at 97. Justice Stevens stated that Seminole Tribe was misguided in several respects,
specifically in that the decision prevented private suits against state entities under federal law, but left
open the ability for federal entities to sue the states for the same violations. Id. at 98.
240. Id. at 97-98; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 1999) (defining stare decisis
as "[tihe doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial
decisions when the same points arise again in litigation"). Justice Stevens did not reject the doctrine,
but instead contended that constitutional interpretation should be based more on the original intent of
the Framers than on "novel" judicial interpretations of doctrines such as sovereign immunity. Kimel,
528 U.S. at 97-98. He also noted that the majority discounted the doctrine of stare decisis in its
repeated overruling of earlier precedent in cases similar to Kimel. Id. at 98 n.7 (citing Coll. Sav. Bank
v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 660, 675-83 (1999) (overruling Parden v.
Terminal Ry. Co. of Ala. Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964)); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 63-73 (1996) (overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 401 U.S. 1 (1989)); Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (Stevens, J. dissenting)).
241. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 98-99 (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), Fla. Prepaid Post-
secondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), and Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999)).
242. Id. at 99 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing the rule from Atasca-
dero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)). Justice Thomas stated that compliance with
this rule was especially important in wide-reaching statutes such as the ADEA. Id.
243. Id. at 100; see also 29 U.S.C. § 626 (c)(1) (1994) (stating in part: "Any person aggrieved
may bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will
effectuate the purposes of this Act").
244. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 100. Specifically, Justice Thomas found the lack of a clear intent to abro-
gate state immunity in § 255(d) because that section only applies to the FLSA, and was not mentioned
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He looked to Employees of Department of Public Health and
Welfare of Missouri v. Department of Public Health and Welfare of
Missouri,2 45 specifically at its holding that there was no intent to abrogate
state immunity with the language used in that case. 246 Justice Thomas
noted that Employees centered on the idea that "the history and tradition
of the Eleventh Amendment indicate that by reason of that barrier, a
federal court is not competent to render judgment against a
nonconsenting State." 247 Thus, he argued that it should not be assumed
that all federal courts were competent to hear suits against those states
that had not waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity because
Congress had not clearly stated its intention to abrogate state immunity
in § 626.248 In Justice Thomas' opinion, it was important to consider
that the phrase "court of competent jurisdiction" used in Employees was
no different from that used in the ADEA.249
Second, Justice Thomas looked to § 216(b) of the ADEA and §
6(d)(1) of the 1974 amendments to the FLSA that altered it.250 He
argued that Congress was unaware of the impact of the 1974 Amend-
ments on the different enforcement provisions of §§ 216(b) and 626(b),
because it would have included a clear statement of abrogation of state
sovereign immunity into § 626(b) if it had intended to do So.251 He
noted his skepticism that Congress deliberated on the consequences of
amending an existing act with provisions from another existing act, when
the former act is not mentioned in the amending act. 252 Justice Thomas
in the amendment to the ADEA. Id. at 108-09.
245. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
246. Employees, 411 U.S. at 285. Employees concerned public health employees suing for lost
overtime wages under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Id. at 281. In Employees, the
Court determined that when Congress enacted the FLSA, it did not intend to abrogate state immunity
with respect to employees of state nonprofit institutions because they have little impact on interstate
commerce. Id. at 284-85; see also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 100.
247. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 108 (quoting Employees, 411 U.S. at 284).
248. Id. (citing Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 579 (1946)) (hold-
ing that federal court was not a court of competent jurisdiction for a Utah state tax law that did not
specify an intent to abrogate state immunity in federal court in the language of the statute).
249. Id. at 101.
250. Id. at 102; see also supra note 206 and accompanying text; 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b)(1994); Id. § 255(d)(1994) (1974 Amendments) (suspending the statute of limitations on cases based
on § 216 so that those plaintiffs could avail themselves of the newly-enacted § 216 which clearly
abrogated state sovereign immunity). Justice Thomas stated that the language regarding the statute of
limitations was a reaction to Employees, which was a decision based on the FLSA, not the ADEA.
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 103. He thus asserted that § 6(d)(1) was considered only as an amendment to the
FLSA, and its impact on the ADEA was not fully explored. Id.
Justice Thomas also noted the Court's determination that the ADEA was referenced in the 1974
amendments through § 28. Id. at 104. However, Justice Thomas asserted that section 6(d)(2)(A) was
more persuasive authority than § 28 of the amendment because it was closer in "space and purpose"
to § 6(d)(1). Id. Therefore the inference in § 6(d)(1) that the amendment was targeted only at the
FLSA should be more controlling than the inference in § 28 that the ADEA was incorporated. Id.
251. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 102. In fact, Justice Thomas noted that the act which amended § 216(b)
did not even mention § 626(b). Id.
252. Id. at 102. "Congress, acting responsibly, would not be presumed to take such action[increasing state liability and decreasing state sovereign immunity] silently." Id. at 101 (quoting
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stated that the impact of § 6(d)(2)(A) on the ADEA made no sense,
because it showed a lack of thoughtfulness regarding the impact of the
two provisions on each other.253 He asserted that this raised a shadow of
a doubt, which did not comport with an unequivocal declaration of intent
to abrogate state sovereign immunity. 254 He stated that Union Gas was
different, because that case involved an amendment of an act, not an
amendment of an amendment to an act, as was the case in Kimel.255
Finally, Justice Thomas stated that § 626(b) did not incorporate a
private right of action into § 216(b).256 He argued that § 626(c) already
had its own private right of action provision and incorporating the one
contained in § 216(b) would be superfluous. 257 He argued for an
interpretation wherein § 626(c)(1) would be an exclusive right of action,
which could be added to the provisions in §§ 626(c)(2) and 216(b),




In Kimel, the Court affirmed the idea that the Court's blind defer-
ence to Congress is dead. 259 The detailed analysis present in Kimel has
prompted review of other congressional acts. 260 Recently, in University
Employees, 411 U.S. at 284-85). He noted that the interaction of the provisions raised a "permissible
inference" rather than the "unequivocal declaration" required to abrogate state sovereign immunity.
Id. at 104.
253. Id. at 103-04.
254. Id. at 104.
255. Id. at 105; see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7-13 (1989). Justice
Thomas presumably would require that amendments that affect more than one legislative act require a
clear statement of impact on all prior legislation affected by the amendment. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 102.
Justice Thomas was also concerned that § 626(e) was amended in 1991 by the Civil Rights Act which
removed the incorporating reference at § 255(d). Id. at 103, n.3. (citing Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h-6 (1994 & Supp. V 1999))).
256. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 105.
257. Id. at 106.
258. Id. The additions contained in § 216(b) include collective actions, attorneys fees and liqui-
dated damages. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994). Section 626(c)(2) provides for the right to trial by jury.
29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1994). Justice Thomas noted that the majority's interpretation was a "permis-
sive inference," rather than the required "unequivocal declaration" which precedent requires. Kimel,
528 U.S. at 106 (citing Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 232 (1989)).
259. City of Boeme v. Florida, 521 U.S. 507, 531-32 (1997) (defining and questioning the con-
cept of judicial deference to congressional acts); see also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 74 (introducing a two-
step inquiry to determine if Congress did indeed clearly intend and have the power to abrogate state
immunity when it enacted the ADEA).
260. Kimel Changes Everything, in 18 DsABILTrrY COMPLIANCE BULLETIN 6 (LRP Publications
Aug. 25, 2000).
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of Alabama Board of Trustees v. Garrett,26 1 the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) was subjected to Kimel-type scrutiny. 262
Garrett involved state employees who sued Alabama state agencies
under three federal statutes, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Rehabilitation Act), and the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993
(FMLA).263 The Eleventh Circuit found that Alabama was immune from
suit only under the specific provision of the FMLA which was addressed
in the case.264 Relying on their prior decision in Kimel, wherein the
ADA was found to be a valid exercise of Congress' Fourteenth Amend-
ment enforcement power, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision up-
holding sovereign immunity. 265 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
261. 193 F.3d 1214 (1 th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 529 U.S. 1065 (2000), reversed by 531 U.S.
356 (2001).
262. Garrett, 193 F.3d at 1218-21; see also Mary Bomgren, The Eleventh Amendment and the
Threat to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 79 MICH. B.J. 1670, 1672 (2000) (stating that there are
over fifty-four million disabled people currently living in the United States who could be affected if
the ADA is found unconstitutional). Coincidentally, the ADA was addressed by the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in Kimel, but the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari with respect to the validity of
that Act. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 139 F. 3d 1426, 1433 (1998).
263. Garrett, 193 F.3d at 1216; see also Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-
336, 104 Stat. 328 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)); Rehabilitation,
Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)); Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993, Pub. L. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)). Patricia
Garrett sued her employer, the University of Alabama Hospital, for reassigning her to a lower-paying
position upon her return to work due to a leave of absence to battle breast cancer. Brief for
Respondent at *2, Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs., 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (No. 99-1240). She sued
for compensatory and punitive damages under the ADA, but the district court dismissed the action
based on the University's claim of sovereign immunity and Garrett appealed. Id. at *3; see also
Garrett v. Bd. of Trs., 989 F. Supp. 1409, 1412 (N.D. Ala. 1998).
Garrett also contained the case of Milton Ash, an employee of the Alabama Department of
Youth Services. Respondent's Brief at *3-*5, Garrett (No. 99-1240). Ash claimed that he was
discriminated against because the department did not take efforts with regard to his work conditions or
schedule in order to accommodate the severe asthma, sleep apnea, diabetes, and obstructive
pulmonary disease which limited his ability to breathe, sleep, work, and care for himself. Id. at *3-*4.
The district court also dismissed his claims for compensatory and punitive damages based on the
state's claim of sovereign immunity and Ash appealed. Id. at *5; see also Garrett, 989 F. Supp. at
1412.
264. Garrett, 193 F.3d at 1216.
265. Id. at 1218. The Supreme Court in Kimel invalidated the defense of sovereign immunity
with respect to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), not the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (ADA) which was at issue in Garrett. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66-67; Garrett, 193 F.3d at 1216.
Kimel did involve a challenge to the ADA at the Eleventh Circuit level but that Act was not addressed
by the Supreme Court. Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1428 n.2. However, many courts have used the abbrevia-
tion ADA to describe the Age Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (1994) rather than the Americans
with Disabilities Act. See Adams v. Lewis Univ., No. 97-C7636, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3413 at *12
(N.D. Il. Mar. 12, 1999); Heckman v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 19 F. Supp. 2d 468, 469 (M.D.
N.C. 1998); Action Alliance of Senior Citizens of Greater Philadelphia v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 1449, 1458
(D. D.C. 1998); Simmons v. Middle Tenn. State Univ., No. 95-6111, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 17751 at
*2 (6th Cir. July 11, 1997); Parker v. Wakelin, 887 F. Supp. 14, 15 (D. Me. 1995); Hilow v. Rome City
Sch. Dist., No. 91-CV 567, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8953 at *9 (N.D. N.Y. June 6, 1994); Gettle v.
Amcel Corp., No. C-92-0503-DLJ, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *2 (N.D. Ca. May 18, 1992); Action
Alliance of Senior Citizens of Greater Philadelphia v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 77, 82 (D. D.C. 1991);
Rannels v. Hargrove, 731 F. Supp. 1214, 1216 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Stephanidis v. Yale Univ., 652 F. Supp.
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to determine if the ADA is indeed a valid exercise of Congress'
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.266
As in Kimel, the Court upheld state sovereign immunity at the
expense of the federal law in Garrett.267 The Court held the ADA was
improperly applied to state governmental employers under Congress'
Fourteenth Amendment remedial power. 268 In limiting the reaches of
the ADA, the Court looked at the legislative history behind the Act to
determine if it clearly showed a pattern of unconstitutional conduct by
the states that warranted remedial action by Congress. 269 It used the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 as an example of proper congressional abro-
gation of state sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment. 270
It then compared the enactment of the ADA to the enactment of the
Voting Rights Act and noted that the evidence supporting the passage of
the ADA did not sufficiently show unconstitutional discrimination
against disabled persons by the states. 271
The Court did note that there was substantial evidence of discrimi-
nation by the public at large, but the small number of those cases which
were actually attributed to state governmental actors did not warrant the
abrogation of state sovereign immunity under Fourteenth Amendment
power.272 Justice Breyer dissented, attaching congressional hearing evi-
dence to support his view that the evidence Congress considered was
sufficient to show that the ADA did address a constitutional violation
requiring a national remedy. 273 However, the Court again reminded
potential plaintiffs that state remedies were available for disability
discrimination claims. 274
In addition to its impact on subsequent cases before the Supreme
Court, Kimel has sparked responses in Congress. 275 Despite the Court's
assurance that there was still an adequate forum for the rights of ag-
grieved older workers in the state courts, a bill was introduced into the
United States Senate on September 6, 2000, which would "close the loop-
110, 112 (D. Conn. 1986); Action Alliance of Senior Citizens of Greater Philadelphia v. Heckler, 789
F.2d 931, 934 (D. D.C. 1986).
266. Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001).
267. Id. at 967-68.
268. Id. at 966-67.
269. Id. at 964-65.
270. Id. at 967; see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (citing Voting
Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974e
(1994 & Supp. V 1999))).
271. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 967-68.
272. Id. at 965.
273. Id. at 969-93 (listing congressional hearings on the ADA, federal anti-disability discrimina-
tion laws enacted prior to the ADA, and submissions of disability discrimination incidents within each
state).
274. Id. at 968 n.9; see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91-92 (2000).
275. Jennifer Sergent, Federal Law Might Aid Age Bias Lawsuits, THE STUART NEWS/PORT ST.
LUCIE NEWS (Stuart, FL), Sept. 7, 2000, at C7.
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hole in the ADEA" exemplified by the Kimel decision. 276 This bill
would require states to surrender their immunity from suit for ADEA
claims by withholding federal dollars for other programs to those states
which did not comply. 277 Another bill was introduced into the United
States House of Representatives on June 7, 2000, which would require
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to mediate employee
claims under certain federal laws.278 The acts affected by this bill would
include not only the ADEA and the ADA, but also the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.279
B. NORTH DAKOTA IMPACT
The closing paragraphs of Kimel reminded all state employees that
they still have a right of action for age discrimination in state courts. 280
North Dakota state employees are no exception. 281 North Dakota Cen-
tury Code section 34-01-17 provides a specific statutory provision
prohibiting discrimination in employment based solely on age. 282 The
statute specifically exempts mandatory retirement provisions that are not
tailored to evade compliance with section 34-01-17.283
In Selland v. Fargo School District, 284 the North Dakota Supreme
Court examined one such mandatory retirement policy in a manner
similar to that used in Kimel.285 Cynthia Selland sued the Fargo School
district when it refused to allow her an exception to the school's manda-
276. Older Workers Rights Restoration Act of 2000, S. 3008, 106th Cong. § 2 (2000),
reintroduced as Older Workers Rights Restoration Act of 2001, S. 928, 107th Cong. § 1 (2001), 147
CONG. REc. 5438 (2001).
277. Older Workers Rights Restoration Act, supra note 276; see also Congressional Press
Release, Jim Jeffords, Senator, Loophole to be Introduced, (Sept. 5, 2000) (on file with author). This
bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions on September 6,
2000. See 146 CONG. REc. 8105 (2000). The 2001 version of this bill was referred to the Committee
on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions on May 22, 2001. See 147 CONG. REC. 5438 (2001). The
bill was ordered to be reported without amendment favorably on Sept. 13, 2001. See 147 CONG. REC.
893 (2001).
278. National Employment Dispute Resolution Act of 2000 (NEDRA), H.R. 4593, 106th Cong. §
2 (2000). The bill was reintroduced on Mar. 1, 2001 as H.R. 820, 107th Cong. § 1 (2001).
279. Nat'l Employment Dispute Resolution Act, supra note 278. This bill was referred to the
House Committee on Education and the Workforce on June 7, 2000. See 146 CONG. REc. 4035 (2000).
The bill was reintroduced and referred to the House Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce on Mar. 1,
2001. It was sent to the Subcomm. on Employer Relations on April 30, 2001. 147 CONG. REC. 621
(2001).
280. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91-92 (2000).
281. N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-17 (1987).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. 285 N.W.2d 567 (N.D. 1979).
285. Selland, 285 N.W. 2d at 574-75.
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tory retirement policy when she reached age sixty-five. 286 The school
claimed that its policy was compliant with the state's statutes governing
teachers' contracts. 287 The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected the
school's rationale, however, basing its decision on the principles of
statutory construction and equal protection. 288 First, it noted that there
are specific statutes applicable to school boards that do not specifically
give the power to establish mandatory retirement policies. 289 It also
noted that a more specific statute provides that retirement should not be
mandatory for teachers who reach age sixty-five. 290 Because "the speci-
fic controls the general" in terms of statutory construction, the school
board did not have the power to create the mandatory retirement policy
at issue. 291
The court also noted that attainment of age sixty-five does not pro-
vide a valid reason for nonrenewal of a teaching contract based on lack
of competency, ability, or qualifications as is required by state law. 292
This rationale mirrors the language of section 34-01-17, prohibiting
dismissal of employment based solely on age. 293 The North Dakota
statute goes beyond the requirements of federal equal protection cases
based on age, which allow age-based classifications if they are reasona-
bly related to a legitimate state interest. 294 Therefore, for North Dakota
and other state employees, Kimel is actually a good -reminder that there
may be more protection under the state age discrimination statutes than
under the ADEA.
However, it is beneficial to note that in practice, an age discrimi-
nation suit is not easily won, even in the state court. 295 In Anderson v.
286. Id. at 570.
287. Id. The two provisions at issue were N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 15-47-27 and 15-47-38 (1993 &
Supp. 1999). Section 27 requires that the school district give written notification to any teacher whose
contract will not be renewed, stating the reasons for the nonrenewal of the contract. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 15-47-27. If no notice is given, the statute provides that it will be constructively assumed that the
teacher's contract will be renewed. Id.
Section 38 provides that teachers who are being considered for nonrenewal of contracts must be
given written notice of the reasons for action, and a meeting must be held between the teacher and the
school board to discuss the reasons for the contemplated nonrenewal. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-38.
The statute further requires that the reasons for the nonrenewal of the contract must be based on
nonarbitrary reasons, such as lack of funding for teaching staff, inability or incompetence, or lack of
the necessary qualifications for teaching. Id.
288. Selland, 285 N.W.2d at 575.
289. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-29-08 (1979) (repealed 1999) (setting forth general powers and
duties of school boards); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-51-17 (1979) (repealed 1999) (specifically addressing
the Fargo Board of Education).
290. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-39.1-14 (1993 & Supp. 1999).
291. Selland, 285 N.w.2d at 574; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-07 (1987) (stating that
general statutes are to be controlled by those which are more specific on a particular issue).
292. Selland, 285 N.w.2d at 574-75; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-38.
293. N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-17 (1987).
294. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000).
295. See Anderson v. Meyer Broadcasting Co., 2001 ND 125, 16, 630 N.W.2d 46, 51.
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Meyer Broadcasting Co.,296 the North Dakota Supreme Court comment-
ed on an age discrimination claim brought under the state human rights
act in the context of a summary judgment affirmation. 297 The court
noted that in order to prevail, the employee must establish a prima facie
case with four elements. 298 Those elements are (1) that he or she was a
member of a protected class, 299 (2) that the reason for the dismissal was
not based on unsatisfactory performance of duties, (3) that the dismissal
was adverse, and (4) that persons not in the protected class were treated
better than those in the class. 300 This last element is becoming more and
more difficult to prove as the overall workforce in the United States
grows older and those workers in the "protected" class are beginning to
outnumber those who are not.301
VI. CONCLUSION
Kimel is ultimately an exercise in limiting the powers of Congress to
abrogate state sovereign immunity. When Congress enacted the ADEA,
it inadvertently directed the courts to use a heightened level of scrutiny
when assessing age discrimination claims. 302 It also assumed that it had
the power to subject the states to suit under the ADEA if they failed to
meet the heightened level of scrutiny. 303 However, because the sovereign
immunity of the states is a fundamental principle embodied in the
Constitution, the Court in Kimel showed that Congress must act carefully
when seeking to abrogate that immunity, even when attempting to
remedy unconstitutional conduct throughout the country. 304
Tracy Laaveg
296. 2001 ND 125, 630 N.W.2d 46.
297. Id. 16, 630 N.W.2d at 51.
298. Id. 18.
299. Id. 17 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-02(1), which defines the limits for age discrimi-
nation as age forty and above).
300. Id. 18.
301. Howard N. Fullerton, Jr., Labor Force Projections to 2008: Steady Growth and Changing
Composition, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, Nov. 1999, at 31 tbl. 8. This article, provided by the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, shows that in 1998, 46.5% of the working population was aged forty and
older. Id. The report projects that by 2008, the percentage will increase to 51.7%. Id.
302. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000).
303. Id. at 89.
304. Id. at 90-91.
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